Dalhousie Law Journal
Volume 2
Issue 3 NOVA SCOTIA ISSUE

Article 12

5-1-1976

Provincial International Status Revisited
Thomas A. Levy

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj
Part of the International Law Commons

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Thomas A. Levy, “Provincial International Status Revisited” (1976-1977) 3:1 DLJ 70.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

Thomas A. Levy*

Provincial International
Status Revisited

I. Introduction
The question as to whether the Canadian provinces possess
international status caused much ink to flow in Canadian legal
discourse from 1965 to 19681. Although the practical problems
incident to an alleged provincial international personality remain
with us in the mid 1970's, the lawyers have maintained a low profile
from 1968 to 1971. In 1971 Anne-Marie Jacomy-Millette's doctoral
dissertation was published as L'introduction et l'application des
trait~s internationaux au Canada.2 In 1973 Ivan Bernier's
magisterial doctoral thesis was published under the title
International Legal Aspects of Federalism.3 Although no new
ground was broken, Professor Bernier stated the existing comparative and international law on federalism and international relations
clearly and thoroughly. In 1974 the publication of Canadian
Perspectives on International,Law and Organization4 kept the
Canadian controversy going in that two articles dealt explicitly with
the issue of provincial international status, while a number of other
studies mentioned the problem in passing. In that Gerald L. Morris'
"Canadian Federalism and International Law" and Andr6 Dufour's
*Thomas A. Levy, formerly Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of
New Brunswick. [The editors note with deep regret the tragic death of Professor
Levy this January in a motor accident.].
This article is based largely on Chapter II of a doctoral dissertation entitled "Some
Aspects of the Role of the Canadian Provinces in External Affairs: A Study in
Canadian Federalism" (Duke University, 1974). I wish to express my deep
gratitude to Professors F.R. Scott, Louis Sabourin and Robert R. Wilson
respectively of McGill, Ottawa and Duke Universities for their helpful comments
on earlier drafts.
1. The literature is summarized in Chapter IV of my M.A. thesis entitled The
InternationalStatus of Provinces (McGill University, 1970).
2. (Paris: Pichon et Durand - Auzias, 1971). See C. Lloyd Brown-John's review
of the volume in (1974, 5 Etudes Intemationales at 730-31.
3. (London: Longman Group Limited, 1973). See my review in this journal,
(1974), 1 Dal. L.J. 634.
4. R. St. J. Macdonald, G. Morris and D. Johnston, eds., (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1974).
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"F6d6ralisme canadien et droit intemationale''5 presented respectively the federal and the Quebec viewpoints, it is perhaps time that
the question of provincial international personality be reviewed
from a reasonably objective standpoint.
I do not claim to be without views on the past, present and future
of the Canadian federation. I merely wish to make clear that I view
the Labour Conventions Case neither as a constitutional disaster nor
as the bedrock of Canadian constitutional development. If I may
state my own preferences, I wish for the continuance of the
Canadian federation on terms acceptable to its major constituents.
However, it is clear that the assertion of international rights and
prerogatives by provincial governments for whatever purpose might
occasion the balkanization of Canada in much the same way that
Norway seceded from the Swedish crown in 1905, or indeed in the
manner that Canada itself acquired "dominion status" within the
Empire-Commonwealth. This possibility makes all the more
necessary a fresh look at the issue of provincial international status.
The following study will examine whether the Canadian
provinces enjoy international status and exercise its attributes,
particularly the jus legationis and the jus tractatuum. The
examination will consider both international law and Canadian
constitutional law and practice. The legal status of provincial
agreements with foreign jurisdictions and of provincial representation abroad will also be considered.
11. InternationalLaw
1. Writers on InternationalLaw
There is general agreement that only fully independent sovereign
states (and international public organizations) may be full
international persons. This principle is as true of federal as of
unitary states. That is, although the federation as a whole possesses
international personality, the central government normally exercises
its attributes. 6
5. Id. at 55-71 and 72-87 respectively.
6. See I Hackworth, Digest of International Law (Washington: United States
Government Printing Office, 1940-44) at 60; 1 L. Oppenheim, InternationalLaw
- A Treatise, ed. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Peace (7th ed. London: Longmans,
Green and Company, 1948) at 113 [hereinafter Oppenheim]; Hans Kelsen,
PrinciplesofInternationalLaw (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1952) at 170;
Louis Delbez, Les Principes Ggngraux du DroitInternationalPublic (3 ieme 6d.
Paris, Librairie G6nrralede Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1964) at 89; J. G. Starke, An
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However, it is not unknown for the member-units of certain
federations to exercise limited rights of legation and of treatymaking, thereby enj oying partial international personality. 7 However,
all the extant examples (the Swiss cantons, the German Ldnder and
some Soviet republics) have been states which possessed full
8
international status before entering their respective federations.
Professor Kelsen held that a federal member-unit exercising
external powers may be viewed as the indirect agent of the federal
state. However, if the member-unit concludes an international
agreement in its own name and is answerable internationally for its
delinquencies, then that entity may be more than the federation's
indirect agent. 9 Whether federal member-units are internationally
responsible for their own delicts is not firmly established due to a
paucity of jurisprudence on the subject. However, the Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States opens the possibility that a member-unit of
a federal contracting state may be a party to a legal dispute provided
that the subdivision first obtains the consent of its central
government. 10
The source of authority for federal member-units to exercise
limited rights of legation and of treaty-making is not fully settled
Introduction to International Law (6th ed. London: Butterworths, 1967) at 108
[hereinafter Starke].
7. See I Hackworth, Digest of International Law at 60; 1 Oppenheim at 168;
Kelsen, Principles of International Law at 171; Starke at 108; and I D.P.
O'Connell, InternationalLaw (London: Stevens and Sons Limited, 1965) at 318.
Professor O'Connell in his State Succession and the Effect upon Treaties of Entry
into a Composite Relationship (1963), 39 B.Y.I.L. 54 at 57 clarified the meaning
of partial international status: "all that can be meant is that it [the member-unit] is
capable of international transactions within the areas of power in which it is
competent."
8. See 1 Oppenheim at 165; 1 O'Connell, InternationalLaw at 318; and Andr6
Patry, "La Capacit6 Internationale des Etats F6drs", in Jacques Brossard et al
eds., Les Pouvoirs Extirieures du Quebec (Montrial: Les Presses de l'Universit6
de Montreal, 1967) at 86 [hereinafter Brossard].
9. See Starke at 64n; Herbert Briggs, ed., The Law of Nations: Cases,Documents,
andNotes (New York: F.S. Crofts and Co., 1938) at 63; and Wolfgang Friedmann,
Oliver Lissitzyn and Richard Pugh, Cases and Materialson InternationalLaw (St.
Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1969) at 202.
10. UnitedNations Treaty Series: internationalagreements registeredorfiled and
recorded with the Secretariatof the United Nations, Vol. 575, 1966, No. 8359,
Article 25. In Professor Lissitzyn's view, the American States and the German
Liinder are responsible for their own delicts. See his "Territorial Entities other than
Independent States in the Law of Treaties", in Hague Academy of International
Law, Collected Courses, Tome 125, 1968, III at 31 and 43 [hereinafter Lissitzyn
(1968)].
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among students of international law. The prevailing view is that
these entities may exercise such rights if their federal constitutions
permit them to do so." 1 The constitutions of Switzerland, the United
States, the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany grant
their member-units limited rights to treat with foreign jurisdictions.
However, these "treaty rights" are subject to central government
consent in all cases. The Ukrainian and Byelorussian republics have
to their credit one bilateral "treaty" each, and these were made with
the phantom Polish "Lublin Committee". The bilateral agreements
of member-units of the other federations have been largely confined
2
to the local problems of border areas.1
The writers who point to federal constitutions as the locus of
authority for member-units to exercise limited external powers seem
to assume a written document. Thus, it is difficult to apply the
principle to a polity such as Canada where the constitutional norms
governing foreign affairs are largely unwritten. Moreover, these
writers are challenged by others who assert that the operative
conditions for the possession of partial international status are the
willingness of the central government to sanction it and the
readiness of foreign states to treat with such subordinate entities.' 3
A variant of the latter position is the view that the experience of
Commonwealth states and the Phillippines illustrates the principle
that recognized international status was gained after the polities had
successfully established precedents meriting such international
4
recognition.'

11. See Delbez, PrincipesGiniraux at 90; 1 Oppenheim at 692 and 796; and 1
O'Connell, InternationalLaw at 349. There are no extant examples of members of
federations other than Canada exercising a limited right of legation. The two Soviet
republics may be exceptions to this statement if their membership of the United
Nations family of organizations is considered. However, the late J.L. Brierly
viewed such membership as analogous to "being or becoming a party to a treaty."
See his The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the InternationalLaw of Peace,
revised by C. H. M. Waldock (6th ed. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1963) at 154.
12. See M. Rand, Compacts Between States of the United States and Canadian
Governments (M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1967) [hereinafter Rand]; E.
His, De la Competence des Cantons Suisses de Conclure des Traitis
InternationauxSpdcialement Concernent la Double Imposition (1929), 10 Revue
de droit internationale et de legislation compar~e at 454-79. See also W. Leisner,
The Foreign Relations of Member States of the Federal Republic of Germany
(1965-66), 16 U.T.L.J. at 346-60 [hereinafter Leisner].
13. Lissitzyn(1968) at 84.
14. Lissitzyn, Efforts to Codify or Restate the Law of Treaties (1962), 62 Col. L.
Rev. 1166 at 1166-84.
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2. CodificationofInternationalLaw
a. HarvardDraft
Some of these contrasting views have found expression in the
various attempts to codify international law, the most recent and
fruitful effort being that of the International Law Commission of the
United Nations. The Harvard Law School's Draft Convention on
the Law of Treaties was the most influential of some earlier efforts
and constituted the starting-point for the work of the International
Law Commission. The article on treaty-making capacity made no
mention of federal states, but the Commentary expressly excluded
the member-units of federations from consideration:
Thus if under Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the
United States, the State of New York may, with tie consent of
Congress, enter into an agreement with the Dominion of Canada,
the agreement may have all the characteristics of a treaty, as the
term is generally used, but it will not be a "treaty" as the term is
used in this Convention, and the provisions of this Convention
are not designed to apply to it.
An instrument to which . . a Swiss Canton and one of the
States of the German Reich are parties, may be called a "treaty"
eo nomine, but this Convention will not apply to it. 15
This quotation implies that some designation other than "treaty"
must be found for the transborder agreements of federal
member-units.
b. InternationalLaw Commission
After labouring for more than a decade on codifying the law of
treaties, the International Law Commission completed its draft
convention in 1966. The draft served as the working document of
the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, held at
Vienna in 1968 and 1969. The article on treaty capacity had
generated considerable controversy, and hence, its evolution should
be traced in some detail.
The Commission's 1953 draft included the following comment:
"It is believed that treaties thus concluded by State members of
15. (1935), 29 A.J.I.L. (Special Supplement) at 704. A more recent private effort
is that by the American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law: The Foreign
Relations of the United States, Proposed Official Draft, May 3, 1962. This work
has been criticized by Professor Lissitzyn for failure to deal with the question of
treaty capacity for federal member-units. See his The Law of International
Agreements in the Restatement (1966), 49 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 100.
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Federal States are treaties in the meaning of international law." 1 6
This statement marked a radical departure from the position taken
by the Harvard Draft Convention. The Comment indicated that the
authority for the exercise of treaty powers by federal member-units
is the permission of the central government as expressed in
constitutional law. However, in the absence of such provisions, the
member-unit may not exercise external powers because it is not
primafacie an international person.
The 1958 draft was less permissive than its predecessor. It denied
federal member-units an international personality distinct from that
of their federations. To the extent that the subordinate entities are
authorized to treat with foreign countries, they do so as agents of the
federation, which alone "becomes bound by the treaty and
7
responsible for carrying it out."1
The 1962 draft returned to the greater permissiveness of the 1953
version, but it added additional conditions for the exercise of treaty
capacity by federal member-units:
(i) If it is a member of the United Nations, or
(ii) If it is recognized by the federal State or Union and by the
other contracting State or States to possess an international
personality of its own. 1 8
The Rapporteur commented that the examples (the Ukrainian and
Byelorussian republics) "if not numberous, are important and
difficult to overlook."1 9 Thus he acknowledged the Soviet Union's
special political interests. However, there are as yet no extant
examples of federal member-units fulfilling the second condition.
During the Commission's 1965 meetings, the dispute between the
Canadian central and Quebec governments on treaty-making figured
prominently. Some members evidenced an appreciation of the
consequences of an article referring to the treaty capacity of federal
member-units. Nigeria mentioned the Canadian controversy as an
argument in favor of rentention. The Soviet Union favored retention
as well, despite earlier disinterest in the matter. However, Poland
16. United Nations, Yearbook of the InternationalLaw Commission, 1953, Vol.
II, Doe. A/CN. 4/63 at 139.
17. United Nations, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1958, Vol.
II, Doe. A/CN. 4/115 at 24.
18. United Nations, Yearbook of the InternationalLaw Commission, 1962, Vol.
II, Doe. A/CN. 4/144 at 35-36.
19. Id. at 37. A noteworthy feature of the 1962 debates was the stout opposition by
the American and Austrian members to any reference to federal states, while the
Canadian member, Mr. Cadieux, favoured the reference.
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dissented from the Soviet view, indicating that there was not as yet a
firm Communist bloc policy on the matter. Moreover, Yugoslavia
suggested that French behaviour toward Quebec might be construed
as interference in Canadian internal affairs. Israel doubted that the
"so-called cultural 'agreement' " between France and Quebec
would be registered, and hence dismissed the problem as
academic. 20 Given France's growing attention to Quebec, the
French member's opposition to special prominence for federal
states 2 1 might have occasioned some surprise. The United States
and Austria maintained their strenuous opposition to the offending
paragraph.
Given the lack of consensus among the members, the Rapporteur
admitted that a provision respecting the treaty capacity of federal
member-units
involved some very serious dangers. There were Federal States in
which the problem of the possible treaty-making capacity of
component units had given rise to controversy. Any pronouncement by the Commission on that question could involve the risk
of such a component unit involving a right
22 under article 3, with
risks to the continuation of the federation.
Consequently, the article was sent back to the drafting
committee, and the following replacement was presented to the
816th meeting:
Article 3 (2): States members of a federal union may possess a
capacity to conclude treaties if such capacity is admitted2 3by the
Federal constitution and within the limits there laid down.
This paragraph was adopted by seven votes to three with four
abstentions.
The only change made by the 1966 meeting was the renumbering
of the controversial article. The Commentary, however, left some
legal issues unresolved. According to it,
20. United Nations, Yearbook of the InternationalLaw Commission, 1965, Vol. I,
8 10th meeting at 248.
21. Id. at46.
22. Id., 811th meeting at 252.
23. Id., 816th meeting at 280. See also the 777th and 779th meetings, In Helmut
Steinberger's view, the paragraph did not mean that federal member-units could be
states under international law. It simply "recognized the competence of States
under general international law to endow political subdivisions with a limited
international capacity." See his Capacity of Constitutional Subdivisions to
Conclude Treaties: Comments on the ILC's Draft Articles (1967), 27 Zeitschrift fur
Auslindisches Offentliches Recht und VZ5lkerrecht 418.
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the treaty-making capacity is [usually] vested exclusively in the
federal government, but there is no rule of international law
which precludes the component States from being invested with
the power to conclude treaties with third States. Questions may
arise in some cases as to whether the component State concludes
the treaty as an organ of the federal State or in its own right. But
must be sought in the provisions of
on this point also the solution
24
the federal constitution.
c. Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties
The renumbered 1965 text served as the working document at the
Vienna Conference which met in 1968 and 1969 respectively in
committee and in plenary session. The article on treaty capacity for
federal member-units again proved to be very controversial.
The arguments in favour of the article included these: the Soviets
asserted that it conformed to international practice; the Czechs
thought that it would provide for present and future federal
arrangements; the Byelorussians and the Ukrainians drew attention
to their "sovereignty", "diplomatic practice" and "constitutional
norms"; while the Nigerians were impressed by the possibilities
opened by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes.25

Of those opposed to the article, Austria held that its excision
would spare third states the delicate task of interpreting a
federation's constitution; New Zealand felt that the use of the term
"State" to refer to both the federation and a component unit was
misleading; Mexico asserted that international law is not concerned
with domestic constitutional arragements; Canada feared that the
article would serve as an invitation to outside states to interpret its
constitution, 2 6 and suggested the difficulty of applying the
provisions to federal states with unwritten or partly written
24. United Nations, Yearbook of the InternationalLaw Commission, 1966, Vol.
II, Doc.A/6309/Rev. 1, Part II at 192.
25. See United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, FirstSession, Vienna
26 March - 24 May 1968, 11 th meeting. See also id., Analytical Compilation of
Comments and ObservationsMade in 1966 and 1967 with Respect to the Final
DraftArticles on the Law of Treaties: Working PaperPreparedby the Secretariat,
Vol. I, A/CONF. 39/5, 10 February 1968.
26. The Canadian fears were not without foundation in fact; for, in January 1968,
the African state of Gabon invited Quebec, not Canada, to send delegates to an
international conference on education. In effect, Gabon interpreted Canada's
constitution in a manner unacceptable to the central government. Ottawa
subsequently suspended diplomatic relations with the African state.
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constitutions; the United States thought that the article would create
more problems than it would resolve; and Uruguay insisted on the
primacy of international law over domestic constitutional law, and
warned against a proliferation of states at international conferences.
The vote on an amendment to delete the controversial paragraph
revealed a bloc pattern: For:-Western and affiliated (30), Latin
American (8), Federations (11), Total (38); Against:-Westem and
affiliated (9), Latin American (2), Communist (9), Arab (6),
Francophone (15), Federations (4), Total (45).27 There were ten
abstentions.
The vote was sufficiently close to cause the word "State" in the
sense of a federal member-unit to be deleted from the article. The
revised text was subsequently adopted 46 to 39 with 8 abstentions
and with substantially the same bloc voting pattern. 28 Jamaica's
suggestion that the article should have had the unanimous support of
the federations since they were most directly concerned apparently
went unheeded.
The 1969 Plenary Session deleted the controversial paragraph on
treaty capacity for federal member-units. The leader of the
Canadian delegation, Mr. Max Wershof, made an impassioned
appeal for excision. He argued that the paragraph was "dangerously
incomplete" because it failed to specify "conferred by the federal
'
State and must have been recognized by other sovereign States. 29
The paragraph also failed to refer to judicial decisions as modifying
a constitutional text and it did not deal with the problem of
international responsibility. It also neglected to say that only the
federal state was competent to interpret its own constitution. To
quote Mr. Wershof:
In federations where the constitution was entirely written and
dealt expressly with treaty-making, the danger might be
relatively small, but it would be real and very serious in situations
like that of Canada where the constitution was largely unwritten
and where 3constitutional practice was as important as written
documents. 0
The Canadian position apparently carried considerable weight,
for the controversial paragraph was eliminated by the decisive
27. There is some unavoidable overlap in these categories. The totals were
summed separately.
28. United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session, 28th
Meeting, at 149.
29. UnitedNations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Second Session at 6.
30. Id. at 6-7.

Provincial International Status Revisited 79

margin of 66 to 28 with 13 abstentions. 3 1 Those in favor of retention
were limited to the Communists and Arab blocs, a rump of the
Franchophone group (including France and Gabon) and some
miscellaneous states. Thus, a paragraph referring to the treatymaking capacity of federal member-units failed to find a place in an
international Convention of the Law of Treaties which is presently
open for signature.
3. Membership ofInternationalOrganizations
a. UnitedNations Family
A related issue concerns membership of international organizations.
Those United Nations bodies which made provision for the
associate membership of entities lacking control over their own
foreign relations include the Food and Agriculture Organization, the
International Telecommunications Convention, the World Health
Organization and the World Meteorological Organization. The
constitutional provisions of each are basically similar. The
"4parent" state must act as sponsor and guarantee the fulfillment of
any obligations undertaken by the non-sovereign, and two-thirds of
the members of the organization must agree to accept the
application. Upon admission as an associate member, the
non-sovereign may not vote, elect or be elected to any position
32
within the organization.
It is generally agreed that these provisions for associate
membership were intended to apply to dependent entities in various
stages of colonial development. There are apparently no federal
member-units which enjoy associate membership in any of these
organizations.
"b. L'Agence de Coopiration Culturelle et Technique (Agency for
Culturaland Technical Cooperation)
A somewhat different picture is presented by an international
31. Id. at 15. Professors McWhinney and Atkey credit the "vigorous lobbying"
by the Canadian federal government in helping to secure this result. See their
articles in 2 The Confederation Challenge (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1970) at 117
and 161n. See also C. Brown-John, "The Constitution and Treaty-Making
Capacities" in Appendix V of Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the
House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, Minutes of Proceedings and
Evidence, Thursday, December 10, at 86. On the other hand it is believed that
France consulted with Quebec.
32. See A. Peaslee, ed., International Governmental Organizations: ConstitutionalDocuments (2d rev. ed. 2 vols. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961).
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organization of Francophonie,l'Agence de Coop6ration Culturelle
et Technique, which was founded at Niamey, Niger on March 20,
1970. The constitutional provision respecting membership for
non-sovereigns is basically similar to those of the United Nations
organizations. It reads as follows:
Within the framework of the full respect for the sovereignty and
the international competence of member-States, any government
may be admitted as a participating government [gouvernement
participant] in the institutions, the activities and the programs of
the Agency, provided that it receives the support of the
member-State which is sovereign over the territory on which the
participating government concerned exercises its authority and
according to the agreed modalities between
this [participating]
33
government and that of the member-State.
However, this formula was clearly drafted with the Canadian
province of Quebec in mind. That is, this particular instance may
possibly become the definitive precedent for a species of official
34
status for federal member-units in international organizations.
4. Summary

It is evident that the question of international status for federal
member-units is not yet settled in international law. However, there
are a few common themes which may serve as useful indicators of
partial international personality for certain members of federal
unions. First, although there is no explicit mention of the question
in the Vienna Convention, there is no rule of international law
which denies partial international status to federal member-units.
For the entity to enjoy such status, however, other criteria must be
satisfactorily met. The most important of these criteria for the
exercise of limited rights of legation and of treaty-making is
constitutional authorization. Normally, this authority should stem
from a written constitutional document. Although it is not
impossible to find ways to derive the requisite authority from
unwritten constitutional practices and "understandings", this
alternative is beset with too many pitfalls and potential embarrassments to be considered viable. Secondly, if partial international
33. Convention Relative a l'Agence de Cooperation Culturelle et Technique,
Annexe: Charte de l'Agence de Coop6ration Culturelle et Technique at 3 (author's
translation). There is no possibility of multiple voting, because each member-state,
whether federal or unitary, has only one vote.
34. The same point is made by L. Sabourin in his CanadianFederalism and
International Organizations:A Focus on Quebec (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia
University, 1971) at 168 [hereinafter Sabourin].
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status is not to be an empty fagade, there must be a number of other
states willing and able to deal with the partial sovereign in the areas
of its competence. A third element, found in the practices of some
federations, is the possibility of ultimate central control and
surveillance of the member-units' foreign relations.
As to breaches of obligations contracted by federal memberunits, there appear to be at least two possibilities. Usually, the
federation will be held internationally responsible and may itself
attempt to collect damages from its member-unit. Alternatively, the
federation may permit its component to be a party to an
internationally justiciable proceeding as is contemplated by the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes.
Since the answer to the question of partial international status
must be sought in a particular concrete case, the next steps are to
examine Canadian constitutional law and practice, and to ascertain
whether any foreign states or groups of states have recognized the
right of a Canadian province to enjoy partial international
personality.
III. CanadianConstitutionalLaw andPractice
1. Personality
No province of Canada enjoyed international personality immediately prior to joining the federation. 3 5 The four original
provinces were all British colonies at the time of union. British
Columbia and Prince Edward Island, admitted in 1871 and 1873
respectively, were likewise British colonies prior to entry. The
provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta were created by
the central government out of previously unorganized territory.
Only Newfoundland possessed full "dominion status" prior to
federation. Like Canada, Newfoundland acquired external
sovereignty between 1926 and 1931.36 However, Newfoundland's
international personality was short-lived, for she suffered insolvency in the early 1930's and reverted to crown colony status in
35. Each colony possessed the legisative power to implement treaty obligations
contracted by Great Britian, but some felt that their interests in foreign affairs were
sometimes being overlooked. See N. Rogers, Notes on the Treaty-Making Power
(1926), 7 Can. Hist. Rev. 29 at 29 and 32 and R. Delisle, "Treaty-Making Power in
Canada" in Ontario Advisory Committee on Confederation, 1 BackgroundPapers
and Reports (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1967) at 125-26.
36. The legal division of the Canadian Department of External Affairs cannot itself
be more precise. See (1968), C.Y.B.I.L 255.
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1933. Thus, at the time of union with Canada in 1949,
Newfoundland had no international status to surrender, in whole or
in part. On entering the federation, therefore, her position became
precisely that of the other provinces with respect to external
affairs.37
In short, no province, whether original or subsequently admitted,
had any international status to surrender. Hence, for purposes of
international law, the Canadian provinces cannot be compared with
the Swiss cantons and German Liinder,38 for the vestigial external
powers of both these entities stem from an earlier period of full
international personality. This is not to say that one or more
Canadian provinces may not have subsequently acquired a species
of international standing. However, to assess this possibility, any
acts of recognition by foreign states and any likely provincial
precedents in terms of legation and treaty-making powers must be
scrutinized.
2. Recognition
There are a number of areas in which it would be appropriate for
foreign states to deal at some point, or in some way, with Canadian
provinces. These provincial international contacts may be classified
into at least three basic types: transborder, economic and cultural.
However, for the time being, evidence of a foreign state's
disposition to recognize an international status for the provinces
should be looked for mainly in the context of cultural relations with
French-speaking countries.
For example, while the United States sometimes permits its states
to enter into contractual relationships with Canadian provinces, the
American enabling legislation often refers to the corresponding
Canadian authorization. On the other hand, the United States
government refused to answer a letter sent in 1966 by the Quebec
Minister of Revenue protesting newly-announced guidelines for the
conduct of American corporate subsidiaries in Canada. 39 Moreover,
37. S.C. 1949, c.1 R.S.C. 1970, App. No. 30. For the problems of treaty of
succession consequent on Newfoundland's federation with Canada, see D.
O'Connell, State Succession, supra, note 7 at 91-93.
38. Although it is recognized that, except for Bavaria and the Hanseatic cities, the
present-day Liinder were created by the Allied occupying powers, historically, the
Liinder have enjoyed partial international personality under both the Imperial and
Weimar constitutions.
39. John Saywell, ed., (1966] Canadian Annual Review at 50 [hereinafter
CAR]
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in permitting Louisiana to conclude a cultural accord with Quebec,
the State Department demonstrated a keen awareness of Canadian
sensitivities.
Although, for the most part, France has acted "correctly" toward
Canada in its relations with Quebec, it became increasingly evident
after 1965 that it was official French policy to recognize Quebec's
"international capacity" .40 Moreover, French officials who visited
Quebec between 1967 and 1969 have refused to visit Ottawa.
However, in a desire to improve its relations with Canada, France
has recently moderated its policy of encouraging Quebec's claims of
external sovereignty.
Switzerland, Luxembourg, Belgium, Laos, Cambodia and South
Vietnam prefer good relations with Canada and eschew bilateral
dealings with Quebec. 4 1 Gabon was the only French-speaking
African state to have acted in a manner which may be construed as
recognition of Quebec's "international status", but Gabon, too, has
subsequently abandoned this position in favor of improved relations
with Canada. While Senegal, Tunisia, Niger and the Ivory Coast
have in the past engaged in bilateral dealings with Quebec, they
apparently did so unaware of the domestic repercussions in Canada.
Better informed, their present practice is to carry on relations with
French Canada through the medium of the federal
government.4 2 Thus, although for a brief period, Quebec found a
number of foreign states willing to recognize its alleged
international status, 4 3 not one of these states presently maintains
this attitude.
3. Legation
Consistent with the experience of most other federal states, the
Canadian federal government has gained exclusively the right of
40. It is believed that France consulted with Quebec prior to both the Vienna
Conference on the Law of Treaties and the Founding Conference of 'Agence de
Coop6ration Culturelle et Technique. For an analysis of French motives, see my
"French Attitudes and Policies Respecting Canada and Quebec" (forthcoming for
the Dalhousie Centre for Foreign Policy Studies). Although there is little of record
on Quebec's relations with Communist and Arab states, the attitudes of these states
toward Quebec's international aspirations may perhaps be inferred from their
pro-Quebec votes at the Vienna Conference.
41. Sabourin at 372.
42. Id. at 373-76.
43. Following the precedent of El Salvador's accidental recognition of Manchukuo
in the 1930's, exchanges of greetings between the Premier of Quebec and a number
of foreign leaders were arranged for January 1, 1968. For a description of the
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legation on behalf of the federation. Ottawa achieved this position
by a cumulation of symbolic and political precedents rather than by
a constitutional text.
By 1880 the Canadian High Commissioner in London became the
highest-ranking quasi-diplomatic official in the Empire, eclipsing in
status the provincial agents-general. In 1907 Prime Minister Wilfrid
Laurier effectively blocked provincial representation at the Colonial
and Imperial Conferences. 4 4 In 1919 the central government gained
for Canada separate membership in the League of Nations and
International Labor Organization. In 1926 Canada and the United
States established diplomatic relations, followed in 1927 by similar
links with France and Japan. At present, Canada's representatives
and immunities as of right
abroad enjoy full diplomatic privileges
45
practice.
and
law
international
under
However, the federal government's position has not gone
unchallenged by the provinces. There are areas of joint or
indeterminate jurisdiction which have made it possible for most
provinces to establish relatively permanent representation abroad at
various times. Indeed, some provinces maintained a presence in
46
London before entering Confederation.
In 1868, a federal-provincial conference on immigration
endorsed a Quebec proposal that each province send its own
emigration officer abroad, although the official would be
"accredited by the general government". However, it was not until
early 1870's that Ontario and Quebec sent emigration agents to
several British cities and to Europe. A certain amount of
federal-provincial rivalry was evident in the British Isles, and a
subsequent federal-provincial conference in 1874 approved an
Ontario proposal for centralization, that is, the abolition of separate
provincial agencies. However, the provinces retained the option of
appointing sub-agents to work under the supervision of the
Manchukuo incident, see J. Gunther, InsideLatin America (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1941) at 130.
44. M. Ollivier, ed., Colonial and Imperial Conferences from 1887-1937, I:
ColonialConferences (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1954) at 241.
45. See the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.
20/13, April, 1961; and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, U.N.
Doc.A/CONF. 25/12, April 23, 1963.
46. H. Gordon Skilling, Canadian Representation Abroad: From Agency to
Embassy (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1945) at 107 [hereinafter Skilling]. See also
H. Leeson and W. Vanderelst, External Affairs and Canadian Federalism:The
History of a Dilemma (Toronto: Holt. Rinehart and Winston of Canada Limited,
1973) at 48.
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Canadian Agent-General. This cooperative scheme was abandoned
in 1880 with the institution of the High Commissionership.
Subsequently, the following provinces authorized the establishment
of Agencies-General in London: Nova Scotia (1885), New
Brunswick (1887), British Columbia (1901), Prince Edward Island
(1902) and Quebec and Ontario (1908).Manitoba, Saskatchewan
and Alberta joined their sister provinces later in this century. 4 7
In March 1882, Quebec appointed Hector Fabre, a federal
senator, as General Agent in Paris. Almost immediately, Ottawa
began to make use of his services, and Mr. Fabre served both levels
of government simultaneously. 48 Professor Skilling has suggested
that Mr. Fabre's main purpose in Paris was to provide the same link
between France and French Canada that the High Commissioner in
London provided between Britain and British Canada. 4 9 Mr.
Fabre's successor served Ottawa exclusively, and it was not unitl
the 1960's that Quebec again appeared in Paris in its own right.
In 1915 Quebec opened a commercial agency in Belgium and a
1940 statute authorized the government to appoint Agents-General
all over the world. However, the only immediate result of the 1940
legislation was the establishment of a travel agency in New York. 50
In 1961, the New York agency was raised to the status of a General
Delegation, and similar ones were created in Paris and London
respectively in 1961 and 1962. In 1965, Quebec opened an
economic and immigration office in Milan, Italy. 5 1
In the 1960's an impressive expansion of provincial commercial
representation abroad took place, with Ontario and Quebec
accounting for most of the growth. Ontario established offices in
New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Atlanta, Cleveland,
47. Skilling at 12-13 and 107. The texts of the agreements emanating from the
1868 and 1874 federal-provincial conferences are reproduced in Jean Hamelin,
Quebec and the Outside World 1867-1967, [1968-69] Quebec Yearbook at 40-41
and 43-44. Although British Columbia did not formally provide for the office of
Agent-General until 1901, the first individual to oversee the province's interests in
London appears to have assumed the title on his own responsibility. See British
Columbia, Legislative Library, "The History of the Position of Agent-General and
British Columbia House, London, 1872-1916" (unpublished, n.d.) at 1 and 7.
48. Quebec, Legislative Assembly, Sessional Papers,Vol. XV-2, 1881-82, No.
27; and Canada, Department of External Affairs, Documents on CanadianExternal
Relations, I: 1909-1918 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967) at 9. [hereinafter DEA,
Documents).
49. Skilling at 239-40.
50. The relevant Quebec statutes are reproduced in J. Hamelin, Quebec and the
Outside World, supra, note 47 at 49 and 51.
51. Id. at54.
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Minneapolis-St. Paul, Brussels, Disseldorf, Vienna, Milan,
Stockholm, Jamaica, Osaka and Tokyo. Quebec increased its
foreign representation by opening offices in Chicago, Boston,
Dallas, Los Angeles and DUsseldorf. The smaller provinces
followed suit on a more modest scale. Nova Scotia secured premises
in New York and Boston, British Columbia appeared in Los
Angeles, San Francisco and Osaka while Alberta established itself
52
in Los Angeles and Tokyo.
Impressive as this proliferation of provincial representation
abroad may be, it was in London that the controversies over the
legal status of these provincial agencies took place. Prior to the
Confederation of 1867, the provincial colonies enjoyed the right to
confer directly with the British government through the Colonial
Secretary. Neither Confederation nor the establishment of the High
Commissionership in 1880 was thought to have constituted an
automatic abridgement of this provincial right. 53 However,
Ontario's Special Commissioner for Immigration recommended in
1869 the strengthening of the Canadian Agent's office in London
because "His is the only recognized Canadian agency in the British
metropolis and to him, therefore, public men, members of
Parliament and members of the Press naturally go for
information."54
The appointment in 1896 of Lord Strathcona as Canadian High
Commissioner to Britain augured a change in Ottawa's attitude
toward the provincial Agents-General. Strathcona assumed the role
of representative of all Canada, including the provinces, and
strenuously opposed the granting of an official status to the
provincial representatives. British Columbia, later supported by
Nova Scotia, Ontario and Quebec, insisted on official status to no
avail. Strathcona obtained the support of Joseph Chamberlain, the
Colonial Secretary, and Mr. Laurier, the Canadian Prime Minister.
When faced with a joint memorandum submitted by the
Agents-General in 1914 requesting official status, Prime Minister
Robert Borden's government substantially reaffirmed Mr. Laurier's
position.

52. N. Fodor, The provincialsalesmen who undersellCanada, Financial Times of

Canada, September 28, 1970 at 9.
53. Skilling at 108.
54. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Sessional Papers, 1869, No. 45, Appendix A.
at 14.
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The controversy was revived in 1922 with a remarkable letter
from Mr. F. C. Wade, British Columbia's Agent-General in
London, to Mr. Arthur Meighen, the Canadian Prime Minister. Mr.
Meighen's reply is not yet available; but his successor, Mr. W. L.
MacKenzie King, assured Mr. Wade that the Agents-General would
be assisted in receiving the recognition to which they were properly
entitled. However, the High Commissioner, Mr. Peter C. Larkin,
had no such intention, and resented Mr. Wade's efforts to represent
the interests of his province without the intervention of the High
Commissioner's office. Larkin's position was sustained by the
Prime Minister on December 12, 1922. 5 5
During the depression of the 1930's, the provinces were obliged to
close their London offices for reasons of economy; but these provincial
operations began to reappear during and after the war years. Professor
Skilling expressed the fear that the reappearance of provincial agencies
abroad" at the worst might constitute a challenge of the exclusive right
to the federal government to send and receive diplomatic
representatives." 56 However, there is little evidence of any such
provincial intention at the time.
Finally, by 1953, the British Diplomatic Immunities Act
(Commonwealth Countries and Republic of Ireland) 57 provided for
the conferring by Order-in-Council
on the Chief representatives in London of the States orProvinces of a
Commonwealth country and on the members of their staff
performing consular functions, an immunity from suit and legal
process and an inviolability of premises and archives similar to that
possessed by foreign consuls in the United Kingdom. 5 8
In addition, the Agents-General themselves were to be exempt from
taxes, licenses and duties. 59
The Quebec General Delegation in Paris was granted a similar
official status by the French government at the end of 1964, and the
Delegate-General received privileges similar to those enjoyed by his
colleague in London. Although he has been provided with an ordinary
55. Skilling at 108-10; DEA Documents, I1: 1919-25, at 33-37; and Public
Archives of Canada, Mackenzie King Papers (M.6.26, J 1,vol. 79), 10 pp.
56. Skillingat337.
57. 15 and 16 Geo. VI and I Eliz. II, c. 18 (U.K).
58. Quebec, Department of Intergovernmental Affairs, "Outline of Privileges
Granted by British Government to Agents General of the Provinces in the U.K.,"

Annex Il-B (n.d.) at 1.
59. Id., Annex II-A.
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diplomatic passport, his name has not appeared on the French
diplomatic list. 60
The staff of the Quebec General Delegation in New York travel on
ordinary Canadian passports while the Delegate-General himself
possesses a special, but non-diplomatic passport. All personnel are
registered with the Department of State, and the Department of Justice
is kept informed of the Delegation's activities. The staff of the
Delegation and its property are exempt from federal taxes, while the
Delegate-General himself is exempt from city and state taxes.
However, as a previous incumbent indicated, "It is largely due to
courtesy that Canadian representatives benefit from the privileges
which they have." 6 1 In order to be on a footing of equality with his
colleagues in London and Paris, he urged that the Quebec Premier
induce the Prime Minister of Canada to obtain consular privileges for
the Delegate-General since he is called upon to perform many duties of
a consular nature.
Although the Quebec Delegates-General in London and Paris enjoy
officially sanctioned consular privileges and immunities, it is
generally agreed that these have been extended as a matter of courtesy,
and that neither Quebec nor any other province rhay claim them as of
right. 6 2 Moreover, Ottawa's intervention was required in both cases6to
3
obtain these particular privileges for the provincial representatives.
Quebec's representative in Milan has neither privilege, immunity
norspecial concession.64 The representatives of the other provinces in
the United States, Europe and Japan are in precisely the same position.
Former Ontario Premier John Robarts has described the formal status
of his province's "diplomats" as follows:
Generally, it appears that Ontario acts abroad without formal
diplomatic privileges and rights. Its officers act as private Canadian
60. Quebec, Department of Intergovernmental Affairs, "Aide-M6moire en
R~ponse aux Questions Souleves par Monsieur Marcel Lalibert6 dans sa Lettre du
18 Septembre h Monsieur Claude Morin" (October 29, 1970) at 1-2 [hereinafter
Quebec, Intergovernmental Affairs, "Aide-M6moire"].
61. Letter from Charles Chartier, Delegate-General of Quebec in New York to
Claude Morin, Deptuy Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs of Quebec,
December 11, 1967 (author's translation).
62. B. Laskin, "The Provinces and International Agreements" in Ontario
Advisory Committee on Confederation, 1 The Confederation Challenge at 111-12;
Brossard at 69,89,229,237 and 439-40; and A. Trudeau,La CapacitgInternationale
de l'Etat Ffd r et sa Participationau sein des Organizations et Confrrences
Internationales(1968), 3 Th~mis 247 [hereinafter Trudeau].
63. Quebec, Intergovernmental Affairs, "Aide-M~moire" at 2.
64. Id.
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citizens, with their formal dealings with foreign governments being
subject to the supervision65of the Department of External Affairs of
the federal government.
In short, the provincial representatives abroad enjoy neither
consular nor diplomatic status, nor are they accredited to the
governments of the countries in which they serve, nor may they deal
officially with those governments. That is, the provinces do not at
present enjoy the right of legation. 66 A former Canadian Minister of
External Affairs expressed the constitutional position as follows:
Although provincial governments are not empowered to appoint
diplomatic or consular representatives, ... , they can, of course,
maintain offices in other countries and appoint officials to deal with
matters67of provincial concern that relate essentially to the private
sector.
Or, as Ivan L. Head put it, the purposes of these provincial offices are to
bring to the provinces tourists or industrialists who will conduct
themselves according to Canadian law. 68 In a practical sense.
however, the complex web of provincial representation abroad is
apparently unique among contemporary federations.
65. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates, No. 133, June 15, 1967 at 4795.
66. The right of legation includes, of course, the right to receive diplomatic and
consular envoys. The constitutional position respecting consuls is quite clear. Only
the federal government delivers the exequatur to consuls resident in provincial
cities, and Ottawa is under no legal obligation to consult the provinces as. to the
acceptability of individuals as consuls. On the other hand, the French government
has conferred on its Consulate-General in Quebec City certain attributes which go
beyond what is necessary for the operation of a consular post. Moreover, France, as
a matter of courtesy, consulted the Quebec government before appointing Monsieur
Pierre de Menthon Consul General. See Quebec, Intergovernmental Affairs,
"Aide-Mdmoire" at 3. Also, the French consular staff of fourteen in Quebec City
is more numerous than those in Montreal (ten) and Toronto (five); and, for that
matter, larger than any other consular staff anywhere in Canada. (The French
embassy staff in Ottawa numbers eighteen). See Canada, Department of External
Affairs, Diplomatic Corps and Consular and Other Representatives in Canada,
June, 1970.
67. Hon. Paul Martin, Federalismand InternationalRelations (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1968) at 39 [hereinafter Martin]. Andr6 Patry suggested s.92(4) of the
BNA Act in supporting the provincial right to establish offices abroad: "The
Establishment and Tenure of Provincial Offices and the Appointment and Payment
of Provincial Officers" in Quebec, Assemble Lgislative, Comit6 Parlementaire
sur Ia Constitution, Compte-rendu de la siance du 5 juin 1964, at R/3-p. 4
[hereinafter Quebec, Comit6 Parlementaire]. Patry observed, however, that to the
extent that Quebec appears on the world scene for commercial purposes, it appears
as a subject of private law. !d. at R/3-p. 6.
68. The 'New Federalism' in Canada:Some Thoughts on the InternationalLegal
Consequences (1966), 4 Alta.L. Rev. 392.
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4. Treaty-Making Powers
The federal government gained the right to exercise plenary
treaty-making powers in much the same way as it acquired the right of
legation. According to a former legal adviser of the Department of
External Affairs, Ottawa secured its treaty-making powers by a
combination of express delegation by Britain, by the achievement of
69
"dominion status" and by judicial sanction in Canada.
Although there is no explicit constitutional provision conferring
treaty-making powers on the federal executive, 70 the following
processes have been distinguished in explaining Ottawa's acquisition
of these powers: first, the process by which the central executive,
ratherthantheBritish executive, advisedthe Crown: and, secondly, the
process by which Canada "nationalized" the Crown. The first process
involved these steps: Canadian membership on British negotiating
teams, separate Canadian negotiations but British signature of treaties
and, finally, the entire process effectively under Canadian control
although symbolically "imperial". The "nationalization" of the
Crown was accomplished by Canadian nomination of the Governor
General who exercises all the Crown's prerogatives including those
relating to treaties, and the use of Canadian seals and symbols in the
exercise of these powers.
The above discussion refers specifically to treaties made in the
Heads of State form. However, from an early date, Canadian
treaty-makers have preferred less formal intergovernmental agree71
ments which do not necessarily require ratification.
An analysis of the subject-matter of Canadian treaties from 1946 to
1964 indicates that almost half are concerned with matters that are
conceivably under provincial or joint jurisdiction, and that the United
69. A. Gotlieb, CanadianTreaty-Making (Toronto: Butterworths, 1968) at 28-29
and 41 [hereinafter Gothlieb]. "Dominion Status" was ultimately recognized in the
Statute of Westminister, 1931. With respect to external affairs, however, the
Statute is an imperfect guide. Section 3 recognizes the Dominion Parliament as
having the exclusive power to legislate extraterritorially; yet section 7(3) restricts
Parliament to the enactment of laws within its competence. The latter clause was
inserted at the insistence of the provinces.
70. The only reference to treaties in the BNA Act is the virtually inoperative s. 132
which reads as follows: "The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all
Powers necessary or proper for performing the Obligations of Canada or of any
Province thereof, as Part of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries arising
under Treaties between the Empire and such Foreign Countries." The origin,
purpose and judicial fate of s.132 have been dealt with in the author's "The
International Status of Provinces," Chapter III.
71. Gofliebat43-46.
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States is the treaty partner in approximately 33 per cent of the cases.
This rather large percentage of treaties with the United States is
explained in part by the problems occasioned by a frontier more than
5,000 miles in length. 72 Since seven provinces share the frontier, the
provincial interest in treaty-making is evident in terms of both subject
matter and geography.
Moreover, the provinces are the ultimate legal owners of natural
resources that may be desired by foreign states; 73 and Quebec, sharing
with other provinces the exclusive right to legislate with respect to
education, 74 is interested in educational and cultural agreements with
French-speaking countries.
In view of the problems incident to the frontier, most provinces have
made hundreds, if not thousands, 75 of agreements with American
jurisdictions. Many of these agreements have been made without
explicit legal authority and few have been challenged by the federal
government.
Saskatchewan has negotiated with New Mexico and Poland for the
curtailment of potash production, and Alberta has held similar talks on
sulphur with Mexico. In 1965, the Premier of British Columbia
arranged a multi-million dollar reciprocal trade agreement with
Japan. 7 6 In these cases the legal question raised is the extent of central
77
control over external trade.
Quebec has to her credit an agreement with a paragovernmental
body in France (Association for the Organization of Study Periods in
France), three agreements with the French Republic (dealing with
education, culture, youth and sports) and an agreement of uncertain
status with Rwanda.
Given the significant provincial interest in international agreements, it is not surprising that some provinces have, from time to time,
72. Id. at 61-64. Although the provinces are often consulted on treaties affecting
their interests, a notable exception is the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. ld. at
77n.
73. BNA Act, s.92(5) "The Management and Sale of Public Lands belonging to
the Provinces and the Timber and Wood Thereon." See also G. Laforest, Natural
Resources and Public Property under the Canadian Constitution (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1969) and appendices.
74. BNA Act, s.93.
75. See E. McWhinney, The New Pluralistic Federalism in Canada (1967), 2
Th6mis 145.
76. Sabourin at 363; and J. Morrison, "Canada's Role in a French Commonwealth" in C.I.I.A., Behind the Headlines, Ocotober, 1967 at 21.
77. BNA Act, s.91(2): "The Regulation of Trade and Commerce."
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claimed treaty-making powers in their own right. Thus, it is in order to
examine the provincial claims and the legal nature of accords already
made.
a. Provincialclaims
The first provincial claim for treaty-making powers was made by
counsel for Ontario in the 1937 Labour Conventions Case. Based on
the alleged coequality in status of the Governor General and of the
provincial Lieutenant Governors, counsel declared that "Ontario
has a right to enter into an agreement with another part of the British
Empire or with a foreign state.''78 However, Ontario has not
subsequently maintained this view. British Columbia has claimed
treaty powers on occasion, but not consistently. In 1965, for
instance, Premier Bennett declared with respect to the export of
natural resources: "all the resources of Canada belong to the
provinces, not to the Federal Government; it is therefore their [the
provinces'] exclusive right and prerogative to negotiate agreements
or to seek new markets for the development of their resources." 79
However, at meetings of the Canadian Constitutional Conference in
1968 and 1969, Mr. Bennett affirmed his support for plenary central
0
treaty-making powers. 8
Only Quebec has consistently maintained that it already has treaty
powers and that these should be explicitly recognized in a new
constitution. Members of the Quebec Parliamentary Committee on
the Constitution first manifested an interest in provincial treaty
powers in June 1964. Two distinguished professors of international
law, Jacques-Yvan Morin and Andr6 Patry, attended a committee
session and made a favourable impression on the thinking of the
members. Professor Patry observed that only constitutional practice
prevents the provinces from negotiating officially with foreign states
without central control. His reference to Ontario's 1937 claim for
treaty powers elicited "C'est bon ga" from Georges Lapalme,
Minister of Cultural Affairs; while Ren6 L6vesque, then Minister of
Natural Resources and currently President of the Parti Qu6b6cois,
found Ontario's claim illuminating. Daniel Johnson, then Leader of

78. [1937] A.C. 326 at 333.
79. Quoted in Le Devoir (Montreal), July 7, 1965 (author's translation).

80. Canada, Constitutional Conference, Proceedings, First Meeting, February,
1968 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968) at 23; and Third Meeting, December, 1969
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970) at 78.
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the Opposition, and destined later as Premier to realize Quebec's
greatest victories in international diplomacy, was clearly unaware of
the provincial power recognized by the Labour Conventions
decision to refuse to perform the obligations of treaties made in
areas of provincial jurisdiction. 81
Although Professor Patry concluded that the provinces lacked
international competence, he urged in his final remarks at the
committee hearing that Quebec acquire the prerogatives that would
permit it to be represented in foreign countries and in international
organizations and to conclude international agreements in all fields
of its legislative competence. Part of Professor Patry's remarks
merit quotation because subsequent Quebec leaders have invoked
similar justifications and motivations:
There is no reason to dissociate two operations of the same act,
making and applying the accord. I do not see why the one who
concludes [the accord] does not have the right to put it into effect
or why the one who puts it into effect does not have the right to
conclude [it]. This is in the logic of things, again they are two
aspects of the same operation which is the concluding of an
agreement with another party. Moreover, if Quebec has the
exclusive right to legislate in the educational, cultural and private
law fields, why should not this same Quebec have the right to
agree with other states and draw many benefits from the resulting
exchanges, to do it with full authority and without restriction?
Also I consider that we are a unique phenomenon among the
world's federations, in the sense that we are concentrated, that
we are a minority in Canada, but that we are a majority in a given
province and that this province is manifesting signs of recovery
and increased vitality. There is no reason, I repeat, that this same
province should not have the right to deal on the basis of equality
institutions in the
with foreign states, [and] with international
82
fields of its constitutional competence.
Professor Patry's remarks were apparently well-received by a
government which had already experienced difficulties with Ottawa
81. Quebec, Comite Parlementaire, R/3 pp. 6-7. Professor Morm referred to the
1937 decision as "la castration mutuelle." Id. at 7.
82. Id. at R/5-p. 5 (author's translation). Professor Patry's views are developed in
greater detail in Brossard. He has subsequently served four Quebec governments in
different capacities, all somehow related to international relations: Lesage
government (1964-66), on contract to interdepartmental committee on intergovernmental affairs; Johnson government (1966-68), chief of protocol and adviser
to the Premier on international relations; Bertrand government (1968-70), deputy
minister of immigration; Bourassa government (1970- ), special adviser to
executive council (cabinet).
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in negotiating an agreement with the French National School of
Administration. 83
Almost a year later, in April 1965, Paul G6rin-Lajoie, the Quebec
Minister of Education, chose the occasion of an address to the
Montreal Consular Corps to claim limited treaty-making powers for
Quebec. 84 Subsequently this view was maintained by the Union
Nationale governments of Daniel Johnson and Jean-Jacques
Bertrand.
The former Union Nationale government presented the following
proposition in a formal submission to the Canadian Constitutional
Conference in 1968:
Within the limits of Canadian foreign policy, member-states
should have a recognized capacity to negotiate and sign their own
governments on matters subject to their
agreements with foreign
85
internal jurisdiction.
A companion document entitled Working Paper on Foreign
Relations was issued in February 1969 in support of the earlier
proposition. The document noted that the BNA Act contains no
reference to treaty-making powers and that neither judicial rulings
nor constitutional practice has yet succeeded in removing
difficulties. Moreover, new dimensions in international relations
are coinciding with Quebec's need to assume its powers to the
full. 8 6 In justification for a claimed provincial [Quebec] treaty
power, the document cited various agreements already made by
Quebec with foreign jurisdictions, the need for Quebec to be a direct
party to them without central government mediation, Ontario's
1937 claim of treaty powers, the International Law Commission's
1966 paragraph on treaty powers for federal member-units, the fact
that the 1937 Labour Conventions decision was not concerned with
treaty-making, the primacy of the constitution over the 1947
Letters-Patent which authorized the Governor General to exercise
83. Quebec, Comit6 Parlementaire at R/3p. 8. See also Trudeau at 243n.
84. Text in Le Devoir (Montreal), April 14 and 15, 1965. The text of Ottawa's
rejoinder may be found in (1966), 4C.Y.B.I.L. 265-66. Despite his new role as
President of C.I.D.A., Grin-Lajoie has not altered his previous viewpoint as much
as one might expect. See B. Morrissette, "Le French Power i Ottawa: Paul
G~rin-Lajoie" in Le MacLean, June 1971 at 44.
85. Quebec, Department of Intergovernmental Affairs, Working Documents:
Propositionsfor ConstitutionalReview (Quebec: July 17, 1968) at 37.
86. Quebec, Department of Intergovernmental Affairs, Working Paper on Foreign
Relations:Notes Preparedby the Quibec Delegation (Quebec: February 5th, 1969)
at 3 [hereinafter cited as Quebec, Working Paperon ForeignRelations].
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the royal prerogatives in external affairs and two Privy Council
decisions 87 which suggest that the royal prerogatives may be
exercised by Lieutenant Governors for provincial purposes. 88
To digress for a critical examination of certain arguments raised
by the Working Paper, Ontario's contention had not been taken
seriously by the Privy Council, nor, for that matter, by Ontario
itself. Article 5(2) of the International Law Commission's draft is of
historical value only. Although the Privy Council was indeed not
concerned with treaty-making in the Labour Conventions case, the
portion quoted by the Working Paper itself made unmistakable
reference to Canada's newly-acquired external sovereignty. In the
context of 1937, the implication was clear that the federal
government exercised the attributes of sovereignty on behalf of
Canada. Thus, there was an implied judicial recognition of the
central government's power to make treaties on behalf of the
federation. The limitation was that Ottawa lacked the power itself to
implement those requiring changes in provincial legislation.
The contention that the 1947 letters-patent are inferior to the
constitution is specious because the former is a constitutional
document. The two Privy Council decisions cited were decided
before the crown's external prerogatives were considered to have
devolved to Canada, and, moreover, the cases had no external
affairs aspects.8 9 Thus, the legal arguments adduced by Quebec in
support of an already-existing provincial treaty-making power are
not very convincing.
On the other hand, Quebec's strongest argument is that it has
already made a number of international agreements, notably with
France, and that these should be viewed as precedents. The legal
nature of these accords will be examined shortly.
87. The two cases are Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v. Receiver
GeneralofNew Brunswick, [1892) A.C. 437, and Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Co.

v. The King, [1916iA.C. 566.
88. Quebec, Working Paperon ForeignRelations at 7, 9, 4, 13, 16, 17 and 18-19.
The present Liberal Bourassa government is not comfortable with these documents,
but it has yet to produce its own policy on the subject. See Government of Quebec,
Statement by Mr. Robert Bourassa, Prime Minister andMinisterof Finance, to the
ConstitutionalConference, Ottawa, September 14 and 15, 1970.
89. B. Laskin, "Some International Legal Aspects of Federalism: the Experience
of Canada", in D. Currie, ed., Federalism and the New Nations of Africa
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964) at 396, interpreted the Liquidator's
case in support of plenary treaty-implementing powers for Ottawa. See also J.
Saywell, The OJfce ofLieutenant Governor:A Study in CanadianGovernment and
Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957).
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Ottawa's rejection of the Quebec position is contained in the
White Paper on Federalism and International Relations issued
in 1968 and in a declaration of policy entitled "Foreign Policy and
the Provinces" made in October 1969 by the Parliamentary
Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs. The White
Paper's arguments include the necessary indivisibility of the
conduct of foreign policy, the devolution of the prerogative powers
to the Governor General, certain statements by Canadian Supreme
Court judges prior to 1937 and subsequent to 1947 and the denial of
international legal validity to provincial international agreements. 90
On examination, Ottawa's arguments in favor of central plenary
treaty-making powers are hardly more convincing than Quebec's
claims for its part. True, the devolution of the prerogatives to the
Governor General is considered to be part of the constitution, but
the 1947 letters-patent have basically served to legitimize powers
the federal government had already acquired extra-constitutionally.
Moreover, as Mr. Gotlieb has shown, the prerogatives have largely
been irrelevant in actual Canadian treaty-making. The statements
by Canadian Supreme Court judges prior to 1937 in support of
central plenary treaty-making powers were obiter; while the views
of some judges after 1949, when appeals to the Privy Council were
abolished, added nothing to what Lord Watson said in 1937.
Moreover, despite what federal government spokesmen say
publicly, they know very well that they exercise plenary treaty
powers largely on the basis of domestic political practice and
international consent, and that in strict law, they operate in a
constitutional vacuum. Otherwise, they would not devote so much
effort to refuting Quebec's claims in legal theory, and to
undermining the force of the provincial precedents in political
practice. 9 ' Consequently, the constitutional issue remains to be
92
settled.
90. Martin, at 9, 13, 14, 25, 26-28. Not unnaturally, Gotlieb's arguments against
provincial treaty-making powers parallel those of the White Paper. See his
CanadianTreaty-Making at 27-32.
91. The 1969 policy declaration is basically a restatement of the White Paper. See
Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 69/18,
"Foreign Policy and the Provinces." See also the Right Honourable L.B. Pearson,
Federalismfor the Future:A Statement of Policy by the Government of Canada to
the ConstitutionalConference, 1968 at 30.
92. Of the Canadian writers concerned with the question of provincial treaty
powers, not one fully supports the position advanced by the Quebec Working
Paper. However, Professors LaPierre, Morin, Patry and Brossard desire

Provincial International Status Revisited 97

It is beyond dispute that the federal government has hitherto
exercised the jus tractatuum on behalf of Canada. But may the
provincial "precedents" entitle the provinces to claim that they are
in the process of acquiring a limited, defacto treaty-making power
of their own? The answer depends in part on an assessment of the
legal nature of international agreements made by the provinces in
three different settings of administrative and political behavior.
b. Provincialinternationalagreements
(i) Transborder and transnational 93 agreements
For the purpose of administrative convenience respecting matters of
relatively minor importance, most Canadian provinces make
agreements with neighbouring American states and with some
foreign countries. Some of these undertakings are authorized by the
federal government, others take the form of reciprocal legislation
and "gentlemen's agreements". Canadian legal opinion is virtually
unanimous in regarding these accords as something other than
treaties. 9 4 Those who have studied the transborder agreements of
American states and German Ldnder have reached similar
conclusions. 9 5
The centrally-sanctioned accords and the provincial
"gentlemen's agreements" are viewed as contracts lacking any
treaty-making powers for Quebec. See also M. Faribault, "The Provincial
Constitutional Interest in Foreign Affairs" in Canada Month, May, 1968 at 24-27.
When he wrote the article, Mr Faribault was serving the late Premier Johnson as
special adviser on economic and constitutional matters. Professors McWhinney,
Atkey and Sabourin, while not necessarily favouring constitutional change, support
greater provincial participation in external relations. Professors Head, Morris and
Delisle support Ottawa's position unreservedly.
93. "Transnational" refers to similar types of agreements made with countries
other than the United States.
94. J.-Y. Morin, La conclusion d'accords internationaux par les provinces
canadiennes ii la lumibre du droit comparge (1965), 3 C.Y.B.I.L. 178; Grenon,
"De la conclusion des traites" at 153n; Trudeau 243n and 245; Brossard at 440; R.
Delisle, "Treaty-Making Power in Canada," in Ontario Advisory Committee on
Confederation, I The Confederation Challenge at 132; E. McWhinney, "The
Constitutional Competence Within Federal Systems for International Agreements", id at 153-54; G. Morris, The Treaty-Making Power:A CanadianDilemma
(1967), 45 Can. Bar. Rev. 502; Rand at 93 and 106; Martin at 26; Gotlieb at 24;
and Robarts, in Ontario Legislative Assembly Debates (1967) at 4794.
95. See the Harvard Draft Comment, supra, note 15 at 20; Lissitzn (1968) at 30;
F. Zimmerman and M. Wendel, The InterstateCompact Since 1925 (Chicago: The
Council of State Governments, 1951) at 42, 75 and 78n; Leisner at 347 and 356-57;
and H. Naujocks, Compacts and Agreements Between States and a Foreign Power
(1952-53), 36 Marq. L. Rev. 232.
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international validity and enforceability of their own. Any legal
difficulties that may ensue would be settled by conflicts of laws
principles; that is, the wronged party may attempt to recover
damages in a mutually agreed municipal court. However, these
agreements depend, for the most part, on the good faith and mutual
interest of the parties, and there have been few, if any, resorts to
litigation.
Although the provinces are not constitutionally empowered to
enter into transborder agreements, the practice is well-established
and occasions little controversy. Moreover, the provincial right to
enact reciprocal legislation in concert with foreign jurisdictions has
96
been judicially sanctioned.
Former Premier Robarts of Ontario has observed that the
gentlemen's agreement is sometimes employed to "effectively
by-pass the treaty-making problem." For example, the memorandum of understanding between Ontario Hydro and the New York
Power Authority "was

explicitly developed ... to avoid the

problems they might each face were they, as governments to enter
into more formal arrangments with foreign government
97
agencies."
The former Liberal government of New Brunswick in 1968
supported plenary treaty powers for Ottawa. However, it expressed
the concern that provincial rights to deal "informally" with
American jurisdictions be protected in any constitutional revision. 98
(ii) International economic agreements
The legal status of provincial economic agreements with foreign
states has received little critical attention. Although these
96. Attorney-Generalfor Ontario v. Scott, [1956 ]S.C.R. 618: [1956] 1 D.L.R.
433. Brown-John has suggested that provincial legislation enforcing maintenance
orders paralleling that in foreign jurisdictions ought not to be viewed as an
international agreement, because this reciprocity extends only to Commonwealth
countries and is thus governed by the inter se doctrine. However, as he himself
admits, this doctrine is difficult to apply to Commonwealth republics. See his "The
Constitution and Treaty-Making Capacities", Appendix V of Special Joint
Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on the Constitution of
Canada, Minutes of Proceedingsand Evidence, Thursday December 10, 1970, 86
at 89n and 93. Moreover, Ontario and Michigan have recognized each other's
legislation providing for the enforcement of maintenance orders. See Robarts, in
Ontario Legislative Assembly Debates (1967) at 4795.
97 Id.
98. Government of New Brunswick, Propositions for Constitutional Review (July,
1968), Proposition 52 and Comment.
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agreements have not yet occasioned public constitutional controversies in Canada, both levels of government are in the process of
examining their respective powers over trade and commerce.
The BNA Act, 1867 granted the central government exclusive
authority over "The Regulation of Trade and Commerce."
However, judicial interpretation has rendered the clause virtually
inoperable in intra-provincial trade, and its applicability to
interprovincial and external trade has been qualified as well. The
only areas of external trade in which Ottawa's control has been
judicially upheld have been the import of liquor and margarine, and
the marketing of agricultural products, including grain. 99
Federal control over external trade has never been challenged;
however, the occasions when appropriate legislation was upheld
have been few. 100 One reference to provincial control over exports
occurred in a 1952 Supreme Court case which authorized central
delegation of authority to provincial marketing boards. 10 1
(iii) Quebec-France educational and cultural agreements
In February 1964 the Quebec Department of Youth entered into a
contract with ASTEF (Association for the Organization of Study
Periods in France) to initiate a program of exchanges and
cooperation. In the Quebec view, the agreement "evidently saved
face for Canada and France in the context of diplomatic relations,
but ...nevertheless permitted us to negotiate directly with France

for all practical purposes, although technically the French entity has
the same jural status as a crown corporation here." 10 2 Ottawa gave
its consent to the agreement in December 1963 in an exchange of
letters between the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the
03
French Ambassador to Canada. 1
In February 1965, Paul Grin-Lajoie and Claude Morin,
respectively Minister of Education and Deputy-Minister of
Federal-Provincial Affairs, signed with their French counterparts an
entente on a programme of educational exchanges and cooperation.
Mr. G6rin-Lajoie subsequently described the accord as an
99. A. Smith, The Commerce Power in Canada and the United States (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1963) at 175.
100. /dat 121.
101. P.E.I. PotatoMarketingBoardv. H. B. Willis, Inc., [1952] 2 S.C.R. 392.
102. Qu6bec, Comit6 Parlementaire, R/3-p. 9 (author's translation).
103. Martin at 26.
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international agreement "negotiated and signed in otherwise
traditional forms."' 0 4 In Ottawa's view, the agreement drew its
international validity from an exchange of letters between the
Secretary of State for External Affairs and the French Charg6 d'
Affaires in Ottawa. 105

In an effort to dispense with these exchanges of letters each time
that Quebec negotiated an entente with France, Canada and France
signed a cultural agreement in November 17, 1965. Included as an
integral part of the treaty was an exchange of letters between the
Secretary of State for External Affairs and the French Ambassador
permitting the provinces to enter into ententes with France within
the framework of the Canada-France agreement. The province's
capacity would stem either from its reference to the authority of the
cultural agreement and exchange of letters or from Ottawa's
subsequent assent.
On Novemeber 24, 1965, Pierre Laporte, the Quebec Minister of
Cultural Affairs, signed on behalf of the Quebec government a
cultural entente with France. The French Ambassador to Canada
signed on behalf of the French Republic. Since Quebec chose not to
refer to the Canada-France agreement and exchange of 6letters, a
0
further exchange of letters was arranged on the same day. 1
In February 1968, Jean-Marie Morin signed on behalf of the
Quebec government a protocol with France on physical education,
sports and popular education. The agreement was made in the form
of a protocol to the February 1965 education entente.1 0 7 Quebec's
evident purpose in adopting this procedure was to sign an
international agreement independently of any assent given by
Ottawa. Of course, the central government could take comfort from
104. The Montreal Star, March 19, 1968.
105.The texts may be found in (1966), 4 C.Y.B.I.L. at 263-64.
106. The complete texts may be found in Canada, Department of External Affairs,
(1965), 17 External Affairs (December) at 514ff. Charles Rousseau viewed the
November accord as eliminating the irregularities and uncertainties of the earlier
February entente. See his Chronique des Faites Internationaux (1965),69 R6vue
G6n6rale de Droit International Public 776, and (1966), 70 Revue G6n6rale 458.
Professor McWhinney described the elaborate Quebec-France signing ceremony in
"The Constitutional Competence Within Federal Systems", supra, note 94 at
155-56.
107. Protocol concerning exchanges between Qu6bec and France in matters of
physical education, sports and popular education made pursuant to the
Franco Qu6bec agreement of the 27 February 1965 on a program of exchange and
cooperation in the field of education. Reproduced as a Schedule to an Act
respecting the Office Franco Qu6b6cois pour la Jeunesse. (S.Q. 1968 c.7).
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the fact that the agreement was cast in the form of a protocol to an
earlier agreement which had already received Ottawa's consent.
There is a consensus among Canadian legal scholars that these
Quebec-France agreements possess no international validity of their
own, create no mutually binding obligations under international law
and are unenforceable in the event of default. 10 8 However, there are
other considerations which merit attention. Professor McWhinney
has written that since the agreements entail no binding obligations in
international law, Ottawa's covering letters were legally
unnecessary.' 0 9 On the other hand, it is recongnized that the
ententes were intended by Quebec to serve, to some degree, as
precedents for de jure international status. As Andr6 Dufour
observed, the 1965 ententes do not have the same importance as the
Halibut Treaty of 1923, "but we cannot deny the analogy." 110
Moreover, it would be helpful to place the ententes in the context
of France's general experience with cultural and educational
agreements with her former African colonies since 1960. In
virtually all cases, the preamble of the treaty underlines the absolute
equality and independence of France's treaty partner. However, the
rest of the agreement reserves for France "certain prerogatives to
protect French interests and to assure the efficacious use of
personnel, materials and funds."." The Quebec-France accords, in
contrast, are based on the absolute equality of the rights and
obligations of both parties. Thus, the international sovereignty of
the African states was negated in practice by the treaties; while the
Quebec accords, having no international legal standing, were, in
effect, agreements between real equals.
IV. Conclusion
International law remains unclear as to whether subdivisions of
federations may possess international status. While there is nothing
in the law of treaties which expressly confers international juridical
108. MeWhinney, "The Constitutional Competence Within Federal Systems"
supra, note 94 at 154-55; Atkey, "Provincial Transnational Activity" at 169; and
Brossard at 74, 95-96, 228 and 440.
109. McWhinney, "Canadian Federalism: Foreign Affairs and the Treaty Power"
supra, note 94 at 131.
110. "France-Quebec Relations" in Canadaand Europe:A New Look (Toronto:
C.I.I.A., 1967) at 153.
111. G. Feuer, Les Accords Culturelspassis par la France avec les Nouveaux
Etats d'Afrique et Madagascarin [1963] Annuaire Francais de Droit Internationale
890 at 902-3 (author's translation).
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personality on federal subunits, neither is there any rule of
international law which denies them such status. There does,
however, appear to be a consensus that for member-units of
federations to enjoy international status, they must have the formal
approval of their central governments and they must find other
states willing to deal with them in the areas of their constitutional
competence. A number of Canadian provinces have received formal
federal consent for their international dealings and they have been
able to find external "treaty partners". However, the circumstances
under which federal "consent" was given and those surrounding
the provincial transnational agreements themselves raise questions
as to how long these two criteria for provincial international status
-

federal authorization and international consent -

will remain in

effect.
As far as Canadian law and practice are concerned, no province
entered the federation with any degree of international personality
and no province has received sustained acts of recognition from any
quarter. No provincial government has achieved a formal right to
legation although the provincial presence abroad is substantial by
any standard. The question of provincial representation abroad was
discussed by the first Ministers in May 1973, but no conclusions
were apparently reached.
Although neither Ottawa nor the provinces have put forth
fool-proof cases for plenary treaty powers, the federal government's
strongest argument is one that it has been reluctant to press publicly
- the inherent right of the central government of a sovereign state
to deal with external sovereigns. The strongest provincial argument
is that the international agreements they have already made
constitute precedents which should be constitutionally recognized.
On examination, provincial transborder administrative agreements with American states are similar in character to those
habitually concluded by Swiss cantons and German Liinder. The
international agreements entered into by these European entities
have occasioned much of the nineteenth century writing on
federalism and foreign affairs. On the other hand, Canadian legal
scholars are reluctant to consider province-state agreements as
international "treaties". The Franco-Quebec educational and
cultural accords are not commonly viewed as "treaties" either, but
their political significance cannot be denied.
It would be premature to draw any "final" conclusions about a
situation which is still evolving. Since at least 1965, the federal
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government has been willing, admittedly under duress, to allow
various provincial governments access to international society.
Three examples may be mentioned - umbrella agreements with
foreign states, plural representation at international conferences and
practical assistance to provincial agents abroad. For their part,
various provinces have increased the scope of their external dealings
and their methods have become more sophisticated and subtle.
While both levels of government have worked out pragmatic
"arrangements" concerning provincial external interests, no
questions of principle have as yet been fully resolved. How long the
Canadian federation can survive in its present form without an
operative constitutional provision relating to foreign affairs remains
an open question. At the Victoria Constitutional Conference in 1971
Ottawa attempted to gain provincial consent for a replacement for
s.132 of the BNA Act, but Quebec, Alberta and Saskatchewan
refused to go along. 112 A detailed empirical study of provincial
international interests and actions might someday suggest a viable
alternative.
112. See Le Devoir (Montreal), June 11, 1971 at 4. A similar proposal may be
found in Canada, Parliament, The Special Joint Committee of Senate and of the
House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, FinalReport, 4th session, 28th
Parliament, 1972 at 68-69.

